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Articles
COMMON-LAW VOLUNTARINESS IN MARYLAND: GHOSTS, BARNACLES, AND
ELUSIVE BRIGHT-LINE RULES
By Andrew V. Jezic 1

I. Introduction:

The admissibility of a confession poses complex
questions that are often overlooked by many prosecutors
and defense attorneys. According to Judge Charles Moylan,
"[t]here is today among many members of the bar an
intellectually undisciplined tendency to treat the Fifth
Amendment privilege as little more than loose shorthand for
confession law generally.''2 This impression that confession
law is relatively uncomplicated stems, in part, from the
promulgation ofcertain bright-line exclusionary rules which
were originally designed to create clear guidelines for police
interrogation. 111is article attempts to denlonstrate, however,
that Maryland's bright-line exclusionary rule regarding nonconstitutional, common-law voluntariness is indeed more
complicated than expected
The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Alizona, 3 by requiring thenow-familiar setofwamings prior
to any custodial interrogation, attempted to establish brightline constitutional guidelines for custodial interrogation.
According to Justice Sandra Day 0 'Connor, however, the
unintended result has been that Miranda "creates as many
close questions as it resolves .... And the supposedly 'bright'
lines ... have turned out to be rather dim and ill defined."4
In 2001 the Court ofAppeals ofMaryland
in Winderv. StateS reaffirmed its own bright-line,
per se exclusionary rule for analyzing nonconstitutional, common-law voluntariness with
respect to improper police promises. The Court
rearticulated a "two-part test" that: 1) any implied or
express police promise of"special consideration from
a prosecuting authority or some other form of
assistance;"6 and 2) which causes a suspectto make
a statement, will render that statementinvoluntary.
As a result, Maryland has one ofthe most expansive
exclusionary rules on improper promises in the
country.7 Yet, like the bright-line rules ofMiranda,
Maryland's per se bright-line exclusionary rule for

common-law voluntariness creates almost as many
close questions as it resolves.
Among the issues that the Court ofAppeals has not
squarely addressed is whether the per se common-law rule
applies with equal force to non-custodial interrogations. Also
unclear is whether implied, improper threats are analyzed
under the per se rule. Moreover, the Court has not quantified
the precise measure of causation needed for an improper
promise to render a statement involuntary - that is, whether
the promise must only have a slight effect on the decision to
confess or whether the promise must be the proximate cause
of the confession. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has
not defmitively addressed how the common-law standard
should apply to the jUt)' instruction on voluntariness.
The Court ofAppeals has also not resolved whether
certain promises are improper. Among these unresolved issues
are: 1) the precise definition ofan implied, improper promise;
2) promises that are qualified by a police admonition that
there are "no guarantees;" 3) promises to tell the prosecutor
or judge of a suspect's cooperation, without promising
leniency; 4) promises ofmaterial items, unrelated to the court
system; 5) promises regarding bail; 6) promises ofcounseling,
without promising counseling in lieu of punishment; 7)
promises to help a non-relative; 8) promises to help a relative
with non-legal matters; 9) playing the "false friend" scenario;
and 10) false promises, which are otherwise not inlproper.
With so many unresolved issues in Maryland, one of
the principal benefits of the per se, bright-line rule - clear
guidelines for courts and law enforcement - has been
rendered, at least at present, somewhat elusive. This should
not, however, be unexpected. The dilemma of analyzing
common-law voluntariness is that "despite over two centuries
ofjudicial and legislative concern regarding promises, there is
no consensus as to when ifever - even in themy- a suspect's
decision to confess in return for such promises reflects the
minimally sufficient autonomous choice that confession law
should seek to assure."8 Similarly, the Supreme Court, which
has "carefully sidestepped promise issues,"9 has stated that
there is "no talismanic definition of'voluntariness,' mechanically

32.1 U. Bait. L.F. 9
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applicable to the host of situations where the question has
arisen .... N]either linguistics nor epistemology will provide
a ready definition ofthe meaning of'voluntariness. '''10
The pwpose ofthis article is to outline the unresolved
issues with respect to the common-Iawvoluntariness test and
to provide arguments on both sides of each issue for both
prosecutors and defense attorneys to utilize in court.
II. VoluntarinessA. Common Law Versus Due Process
In a nutshell, the State must prove, upon proper

objection, the voluntariness ofa confession in several different
contexts:
A) In a motions hearing, the State has the burden to
prove voluntariness, by a preponderance ofthe
evidence, under Maryland, non-constitutional,
conm1On law - that is, that the statement was
not caused by any improper promises or threats;
B) If the State prevails on the common law, 11 the
State then has the burden to prove voluntariness,
by a preponderance of the evidence, under the
Federal Due Process Clause12_ that is, that the
defendant's will was not overborne, under the
totality ofthe circun1stances, by coercive police
conduct;
C) Then, at trial, the State has the burden to prove

to the trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the confession was voluntary.
With respect to the common-law analysis of
improper promises, the Court ofAppeals in Winderv. State13
explicitlyreaffim1ed the expansive per se exclusionary rule
for improper promises in Hillard v. State, 14 which itselfwas
a reaffinmtion ofthe common-law exclusionary rule stretching
back to 1873 in Nicholson v. State. IS The Hillard Court
"required [1hat] no confession or other significantly incriminating
remark allegedly made by an accused be used as evidence
against him, unless it first be shown to be free ofany coercive
ba17lacles that may have attached by improper means to
prevent the expression from being voluntary.' '16
32.1 U. Bait L.P. 10

In defining "coercive barnacles," the Winder Court
summarized the non-constitutional, common-law test as
follows:

Based on Hillard, we glean a two-part test
to detem1ine the voluntariness ofa custodial
confession in circumstances where a
defendant alleges that the police induced his
or her confession by making improper
promises. We will deem a confession to be
involuntary, and therefore inadmissible, if I)
a police officer or an agent ofthe police force
promises or implies to a suspect that he or
she will be given special consideration from
a prosecuting authority or some other fonn
of assistance in exchange for the suspect's
confession, and 2) the suspect makes a
confession in apparent reliance on the police
officer's statement. 17
In applying this test, the Court of Appeals unanimously
reversed three murder convictions and death penalty sentences
based on several "egregious,"18 improper promises made by
the police in Wicomico County.
With respect to the constitutional analysis, in
Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that
the federal due process analysis ofvoluntariness:
refined the test into an inquiry that examines
"whether a defendant's will was overborne"
by the circun1Stances surrounding the giving
of a confession .... The due process test
takes into consideration the "totality ofall of
the surrounding circumstances - both the
characteristics ofthe accused and the details
ofthe interrogation" .... The detennination
"depend[s] on a weighing of the
circumstances ofpressure against the power
ofresistance ofthe person confessing ...."19
In other words, an improper promise is just one ofmany
factors in the due process analysis of whether the defendant's
will was overborne. However, when a confession results
from physical brutality or other tactics which "shock the
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sensibilities ofcivilized society,''20' 'there is no need to weigh
or measure its effects on the will ofthe individual victim.' '21
Although the "primruy putpose" ofboth analyses "is
to protect against government overreaching,"22 the
voluntariness analysis under Maryland common law is
generally more favorable to the defendant than the analysis
under federal due process. 23 The Maryland conunon-Iaw
approach generally applies a "per se exclusionary rule''24 in
which confessions causedby a limited set of police tacticsimproper promises and threats - are presumed to be
involuntary, irrespective of actual coercion. In contrast, the
federal constitutional approach focuses on whether any
number ofcoercive police practices - including promises and
threats, as well as deception and lengthy interrogations-cause
the defendant, under the ''totality ofthe circumstances,''25 to
be actually coerced into confessing. 26 In short, under the
conU110n-law approach, Maryland courts will not examine
whether an improper promise caused the incarcerated
defendant's will to be actually overborne.
The due process test, however, is arguably more
favorable to the defendant in one narrow area. Ifthe police
use certain coercive techniques to take advantage of a suspect
whom they know has a substantial cognitive or psychological
impairment, the Maryland common-law approach provides
little protection.27
Although Maryland courts have often stated that
another underlying purpose of the conU110n-law test is
"reliability," or "the belief that an involuntary or coerced
confession is quite likely to be contrary to the truth,"28
Maryland courts, at least in the past fifty years,29 have not
actually analyzed the truthfulness of a particular confession
or the likelihood that a particular interrogation technique would
cause a false confession. While the conunon law in Mruyland
does not explicitly prohibit an analysis ofwhether a particular
confession is false, the constitutional test does explicitly forbid
any evidentiary inquiry into the reliability, or truthfulness, of
the confession itself.30 Nonetheless, the reliability of a
confession is an important rationale underlying therequirement
thattheStateprovevoluntariness,beyondareasonabledoubt,
to tlle trier offact.31
B. Is the Common-Law per se Rule Necessary For
AllImproper Promises?

Theper se common-law rule is not without its critics.
Judge Moylan recently referred to the Hillard decision as a
"misbegotten ghost."32 The per se rule is based on old
Maryland cases, dating back to 1873,33 which themselves
were based upon the expansive common-law per se
exc1usionruyrule from eighteenth and early nineteenth century
England.34 The primary focus of those old English cases was
preventing unreliable confessions flowing fron1 certain in1proper
promises, which were believed, in those days, to have an
overpowering effect on certain suspects. 35 The English courts
"relied on intuition rather than empirical data to identify
interrogation practices like1yto produce such confessions. ''36
In 1884 in HopI v. Utah, the Supreme Court's first decision
adopting a version ofthe common-law rule, the Cowtcriticized
tl1e expansive common-law exclusionary rule as having "been
carried too far."37
This eighteenth/nineteenth centurypel. se exclusionary
rule which was "carried too far" is nearly identical to the
holdings in HillarcP 8 and, for the most part, in Winder: As
such, tl1ere are several concerns witl1 this antiquated pedigree
tl1at should be carefully reviewed in order to exanline whetller
tl1e full force ofMaryland' s common-law exclusionruy rul e is
still necessary.
First, several sociological studies dispute the notion
that certain improper promises, short of promises of
signijicant leniency, engender false confessions. 39 Second,
it can be argued that the per se common-law rule is
unnecessary in recent times when the defendant now enjoys
several layers of added protections - due process
voluntariness, Miranda, the Sixth Amendment,40 and the
State's burden to prove voluntariness, beyond a reasonable
doubt, to the trier offact.
Third, the per se standard was resurrected in 1979
in Hillard by a Court of Appeals which may have been
reacting to a justifiable fear during the seventies - that a
conservative Supreme majority might overturn Miranda. 41
For example, in 1977 the Attorney General of Maryland,
Francis Burch,joined twenty otller State Attorneys General
in an Amicus Curiae briefforllie eventual decision in Brewer
v. Williams ,42 urging that the Supreme Court abandon
Miranda. 43 By 1980, however, with the Supreme Court's
decision in Rhode Island v. Innis,44 this fear appeared to be
subsiding and, as a result oftl1e recent decision in Dickerson
v. Uniled States ,45 did not actually come to pass.

32.1 U. Bait. L.F. 11
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Fourth, a Supreme Court decision from 1991 has
influenced several other states in repudiating the commonlaw rule.46 In Arizona v. Fulminante,47 the Court announced
that the per se exclusionary rule for improper promises, as
encapsulated in the 1897 Supreme Court decision, Bram v.
United States, 48 "does not state the [constitutional] standard
for detemrining the voluntariness ofa confession." The Court
inBrom held thattheperse common-law test for voluntariness
is subsumed within the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.49 The per se constitutional test
enunciated in Bram is nearly identical to the holding in
Hillmd. 50 Although the constitutional dictaS1 in Fulminante
is by no means binding on the Court ofAppeals in interpreting
its own non-constitutional, common-law standard, 52 the
Supreme Court's repudiation of such a venerated decision
reinforces the need to evaluate the contemporary utility of
the per se standard.
Fifth, in a fifty-state survey, only a handful ofstates
apply an exclusionary rule as expansive as that enunciated in
Hillard and reaffmned in Winder (Florida,53 Maine,54
Michigan,55 Mississippi,56 and South Carolina5?). Whilemany
states have a variation of the per se HillardlWinder rule,
most of these states have watered down the exclusionary
force ofthe rule with selective holdings. Missouri,forexample,
applies aper se exclusionatyrule only forpromisesof leniency,
rather than for any promise ofbenefit. 58 Several states have
recognized exceptions for promises: 1) initiated by the
defendant;59 2) regarding bail;60 3) to bring the suspect's
cooperation to the attention ofthe prosecutor orjudge;61 4)
which are implied;62 and 5) which are unrelated to the crime
charged. 63 Some states have adopted, by judicial fiat or
statute, a modification ofthe common-law rule whereby only
those promises likely to cause a false confession should be
forbidden. 64 Many states simply apply the federal due process
test that examines whether the suspect's will was actually
overborne. 65
Lastly, psychological literature indicates a greater
possibility of an unreliable confession with certain implied
threats than with improper promises. 66 Yet, from 1997 to
200 1, Maryland appellate courts seemed to have developed
a more "police friendly," "totality of the circumstances"
st:'lndard for certain implied threats. 67 Similarly, the literature
seems to indicate that certain types ofdeception -lying about
physical evidence such as DNA - might be so ovelWhelming
to some suspects such that an unreliable confession could
32.1 U. BaIt L.F. 12

result. 68 Yet, with respect to police deception, the Court of
Appeals has consistently utilized the due process, "totality of
the circumstances" approach.69
Nonetheless, even though the Court of Appeals in
Reynolds v. State noted "a pronounced trend [in other
jurisdictions] away from per se exclusion and toward a totality
ofthe circumstances approach,"70 the Court concluded that
"Matyland has followed the old common-law rule, which has
seemed to adopt aper se exclusion Rule .... "71 The Winder
Court, without mentioning this majority trend in the country,
simplyreaffinlled the expansive common-law exclusionary
rule. Thus, the per se test, absent legislative action,72 is fimlly
established in Maryland. Nonetheless, there are many
permutations ofthe test which Ten1ain unresolved by the Court.

C. The Present State of the Maryland Law of
Voluntariness
1. With Respect to Improper Promises, the Court of
Appeals will not Examine Whether the Defendant's
Will was in fact Overborne.

The common-law approach presumes coercion,
upon the showing that an inlproperpromise is causally related
to a subsequent confession. The common-law approach
"relieves the defendant ofthe burden of showing that his will
was, in fact, overborne by such an influence. "73
Accordingly, the Court ofAppeals in Winderv. State
did not analyze whether the defendant's will was "overborne,"
or actually coerced, as is done in the due process approach.
The Winder Court did utilize, once, the term "coerced" to
describe the effect of improper promises on the accused.
The Court stated, "[w]e look to all of the elements of the
interrogation to determine whether a suspect's confession ..
. was coerced through the use of improper means." 74 This
limited use ofthe concept ofcoercion was consistent with the
one-time reference to "coercion" in Hillmd. 75
In so holding, the Winder Court scaled back a trend
in the Court ofAppeals from 1986 to 1997 to assimilate the
common-law analysis with the "totality ofthe circumstances"
analysis. This trend, which applied the "totality of the
circumstances" testto both the common-law and the due
process analysis, began in Lodowski v. State76 in 1986, was
favorably mentioned in Reynolds v. State77 in 1992, and
then appeared nearly completed in Ho/v. State78 in 1995.
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The trend toward assimilation of the "totality of the
circumstances" analysis and the common-law test seemed
actually accomplished in Burch v. State in 1997. 79 Judge
Wilner,80 writing for the Court, summarized the two tests as
follows:
Under State common law, a confession or
other significantly incriminating remark may
not be used as evidence against a defendant
unless, in the metaphoric words ofHillard
v. State, it is "shown to be free of any
coercive barnacles that may have attached
by improper means to prevent the
expression from being voluntary." 1nplain
English, that means that, "under the
totality of all of the attendant
circumstances, the statement was given

freely and voluntarily." The "totality ofthe
circun1Stances" test also governs the analysis
ofvoluntariness under the State and Federal
Constitutional provisions. 8!
Consistent with this trend, the Winder Court
conceded that, "we generally look at the totality of the
circumstances affecting the interrogation and confession ....
[T]o detennine whether a suspect relied upon an offer of
help from an interrogating authority in making a confession,
we exanune the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
the confession. "82 However, the Court did not actually apply
an unqualified "totality ofthe circumstances" test and did
not examine whether the defendant's will was overborne.
Rather, the Court applied the "particular facts and
circumstances" (not necessarily the "totality of the
circumstances') to the causation prong ofthe common-law
analysis.
As such, the Court only examined a narrow set of
factors among those catalogued by the Court of Appeals in
Hofv. State, as part ofthe "totality of the circumstances"
test. 83 The Winder Court did not analyze the defendant's age,
intelligence, maturity, education, or experience with custodial
interrogation. Moreover, the Court did not exan1ine the degree
to which the defendant was restrained (e.g., handcuffs), the
number of interrogating officers, the size of the room, the
distance ofthe interrogation from familiar surroundings, the
tone and volume of the interrogators' voices, whether the

defendantwasphysica11ynUstreated,orwhetherthedefendant
was deprived offood and water. 84 Thus, as described in
Martin v. State, the Winder Court simply engaged in a general
"cause-and-effect" analysis.85
2. Does the Common-Law Exclusionary Rule Apply
Only to a "Custodial Confession?"

The Winder Court stated that the common-law
exc1usionaryrule applies to a "custodial confession."86 The
Court, therefore, implied that there is no per se rule of
exclusion with respectto improper promises made in a noncustodial setting. The Court crafted this arguable requirement
ofcustody from dicta in Reynolds v. State, which had restated
the Maryland common-law per serule in the context ofa
"defendant in custody."87 Quoting from several text writers,
the Court of Appeals in Reynolds stated:
[1]t is the defendant's sensitivity to
inducement while in custody and the
potential impact ofthe pronUse ofleniency
that render the confession inadmissible.
Courts abhor, or at least find distasteful,
promises ofleniency or immunity made by
state agents to defendants subject to the
vuh1erability ofcustodial interrogation. 88
Whether consistent with this dictum in Reynolds or
by historical accident, not one case from the Court ofAppeals
has actually applied a per se common-law analysis to a
statement taken in a non-custodial setting. In 1997 in In re
Eric F, the Court of Special Appeals applied a ''totality of
the circumstances" test, rather than a per se analysis, to an
allegedly improper inducement made to a seventeen-yearold suspect who was not in custody.89 It remains to be seen
ifcustody is not present, whether the Court of Appeals will
apply an unqualified' 'totality ofthe circumstances" testto an
improper pronUse, as was done in In re Eric F, or will retain
the per se exclusionary rule.
On the other side ofthe issue, there does not appear
to be any case from the Court of Appeals prior to Reynolds
in 1992 which stated that custody was a prerequisite for the
application of the common-law exclusionary rule.
Furthennore, it could be argued that ifthe Court of Appeals
viewed custody as a prerequisite to the operation ofthe per
32.1 U. BaIt. L.P. 13
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se common-law rule, the Court in two cases involving noncustodial statements, Reynolds andPappaconstantinou,9o

would not have mentioned the common-law analysis. Instead,
the Court devoted several pages ofanalysis to different aspects
ofthe common-law rule in both cases. The Court ofSpecial
Appeals in Minehan v. State recently analyzed the commonlaw test wi1b respectto allegedly improper promises and threats
in a non-custodial setting; however, the court did not have to
apply the common-law analysis because it first ruled thattl1e
alleged inducements were not improper.91
Furthemlore, in Stokes v. State, a case in which the
defendant was at least detained during a search warrant, the
Court of Appeals did not imply that custody or detention
was a prerequisite for the operation ofthe per se rule.92 The
Court held as involuntary t11e defendant's statements which
were made in response to police threats to arrest his wife. 93
One commentator has argued that promises or threats
regarding third persons would be no less coercive if the
defendant were not incarcerated. 94
3. Does The Common-Lawper se Rule Apply to Implied
Threats?

Maryland courts have sometimes analyzed implied
tlrreats undertl1e due process, "totality oft11e circumstances"
test, rather than under the common-law test. The Winder
Court appeared to leave open the possibility that there may
indeed be, as Judge Moylan noted in Martin v. State,95 an
"aberrational little pocket dealing witl1 t11e impact ofpromises
(though not necessarily of threats) under Maryland
conmlon law. ''96 The Winder Court explicitly held that the
conmlon-Iaw per se test applied to improperpmmises97 and
characterized the improper police statements at issue as
improper promises, rather than threats: "Of course, as
Appellant argues, most oft11e statements we have recounted
can be construed as threats as well as promises. We have
not considered the police statements as tlrreats for purposes
of our analysis because, as promises alone, t11ey rise to t11e
level ofactionable impropriety. ''98 In t11e due process context,
the Supreme Court in 1991 in Arizona v. Fulminante
rej ected the per se test, as embodied in Bram, with respect
to a "credible tlrreat of physical violence."99
Some other recent cases do appear to draw, albeit
implicitly, a distinction between the analysis applied to implied
threats and promises. In 1997 in Burch v. State, where
32.1 U. Balt L.F. 14

promises were not at issue, t11e Court ofAppeals applied an
unqualified "totality of the circumstances" approach to a
continuingtlrreatfrom prior physical violence inflicted upon
the defendant. 100 After Winder, t11e Court of Special Appeals
in Raras v. State relied on Burch in applying the "totality of
ilie circumstances" test to an allegedly inlproperthreat. 101 In
2001 in Jackson v. State, 102 a case involving a continuing
threat of physical abuse oft11e suspect, t11e Court of Special
Appeals quoted from Burch in asserting that the commonlaw test is governed by the "totality of the circumstances"
test.
By comparison, while Maryland appellate courts
sometimes apply the "totality oft11e circumstances" testto
implied threats, this test has almost never been actually
applied to examine t11e causation from an improper promise.
From 1986 and 2001, in most instances in which t11eCourt
of Appeals mentions an unqualified "totality of the
circumstances" test, promises were eit11ernot at issue ort11e
Court did not have to actually analyze the effect ofan improper
promise. 103
On the other side ofthe argument, the vast majority
ofMaryland cases have not mentioned any difference in t11e
analysis between threats and promises. In Nicholson v.
State, 104 and a long line of subsequent cases from the Court
of Appeals, t11e Court recited the same test for promises and
threats. 105 For example, the Court in 1980 in Stokes v. State
applied t11e common-law rule and held t11at "a promise not to
arrest a nearrelative of the defendant, or a threat to do so,
constitutes the fonn ofinducenlentwhich will render a resulting
statementinvoluntary."I06 In Wznderitself, t11eCourtstatedin
dicta iliat the first part of the Hillard test is to "detemline
whether the police or a State agent made a threat, promise,
orinducement."107 InHofv. State, Judge Moylan stated that
a "conditional promise is, by definition, a threat in the
eventuality t11e condition is not satisfied. "108 He went on to
quote MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE: 109 "Whether an
interrogator's language will be construed as promising a benefit
or as tlrreatening a detriment in such situations is a matter of
very subjective choice." O1her commentators agree t11at, "t11e
relative morality ofpurchasing a confession wit11 [a promise]
as opposed to obtaining one by use oftlrreats lies very much
in the eye ofthe beholder."l1 0
A recent 4-3 decision from the Court of Appeals in
Pringle v. State, III placed in some doubt the existence of
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any significant distinction between improper threats and
promises. In Plingle, the police detained three passengers
in a car that contained cocaine in a closed compartment in the
back seat. The defendant, who was not the registered owner,
was in the front passenger seat. The officer told the detained
passengers after finding the drugs, "if no one admitted to
ownership ofthe drugs he was going to arrest them all. "112
No one responded, and the officer placed all three passengers
under arrest. Two hours later, the defendant confessed after
waiving hisMiranda rights. After concluding that there was
no probable cause for the arrest, the Court perfonned a Fourth
Amendment attenuation analysis ofthe taint ofthe illegal arrest
on the confession. I 13 As part ofthis taint analysis, the Court
conducted an "exploration ofvoluntariness" ofthe confession
and concluded that there was no attenuation ofthe "coercive
effect" of the "inducement" (threat) that had occurred two
hours earlier.
The Pringle Court indicated in several ways that it
was, in effect, conducting aper se common-law analysis of
the voluntariness ofthe threat The Court recited the commonlaw test, but did not quote any due process cases, nor make
mention of whether the defendant's will was overborne. I 14
Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals in Minehan v.
State l15 analyzed alleged threats in the common law context
without mentioning the "totality ofthe circumstances."
It can also be argued that courts should give the
defendant more protection from police threats than from
improper promises. For instance, the threat to arrest a loved
one, by its very nature, is more coercive than a promise not
to arrest a loved one. 116 In fact, studies indicate that people
perceive threats to be more coercive upon the subject's
decision to confess than direct or implied promises. 117 For
example, the Supreme Court ofNevada held that, while it
may be pemrissible to promise the suspect to tell the prosecutor
of his cooperation, it is impennissible to tell the suspect that
his failure to cooperate will be communicated to the
prosecutor. I 18
The Court ofAppeals has expressed no ambiguity,
however, in holding that threats pertaining to constitutional
rights will render the subsequent statement involuntary. In
Thiess v. State,119 the threat to keep the suspect held
incommunicado until he confessed rendered a confession
involuntary. In Lewis v. State,120 the Court of Appeals
indicated that it was improper for a detective to make a threat

that the defendant would be labeled a murdererifhe requested
a lawyer.
4. What Measure of Causation is Required from the
Improper Influence?

What ifthe defendant was only slightIy influenced by
an improper promise? What ifthe defendant was plimarily
influenced by genuine remorse, but also by an improper
promise? Maryland appellate courts have seldom addressed
the precise measure ofcausation required by the commonlaw rule.
Notably, in thefirstvoluntariness case in Maryland,
Nicholson v. State, the defendant argued that "[t]he law does
not measure the force ofthe influence used, or decide upon
its effect upon the mind ofthe prisoner, and therefore excludes
the declaration, ifany degree ofinfluence was exerted."121
The Court of Appeals, however, did not reach this issue
because the Court accepted the trial court's factual finding
that the officers' denials of any in1proper promise or threat
were credible. In 1887 in Biscoe v. State, the second case
in Maryland involving improper promises, the Court conceded
that, "[i]tis not, of course, an easy matter to measure in aU
cases the force of the influence used, or to decide as to its
precise effect upon the mind ofthe prisoner.... "122 However,
the Court again did not reach the issue ofhow to measure the
influence oftIle inducement. 123
Despitehaving identifiedthe issue in these early cases,
the Court of Appeals has not squarely decided the precise
measure of causation needed for an improper influence to
render a statement involuntary. The W'inderCourt only stated:
The second prong offue Hillardtest triggers
a causation analysis to detern1ine whether
there was a nexus between the promise or
inducement and the accused's confession.
In Reynolds, we made clear that "[i]f a
suspect did not rely on an interrogator's
comments, obviously, the statement is
admissible regardless of whether the
interrogator had articulated an improper
inducement .... As to the second factor,
the reliance, or nexus, between the
inducement and the statement, to detemrine
whether a suspect relied upon an offer of
32.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 15
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help from an interrogating authority in making
a confession we examine theparticularfac1s
and circumstances surrounding the
confession. l24
In Winder, the Court engaged in a general "causeand-effect" analysis that considered a few "attenuat[ing]"
factors, such as the timing ofthe inducement in relation to the
confession, the level ofintimidation felt by the defendant, any
"intelVening" factors (new interrogation locations), and the
flagrancy ofthe police conduct. 125 The Court also emphasized
that the timing ofthe confession in relation to the inducement
was "critical. "126 The Court stated as well that "a singular
[police] statement communicated to the suspect may be
sufficient to qualifY as an inappropriate offer ofhelp. "127
The Winder Court considered two cases which also
seemed to apply a general "cause-and-effect" analysis that
considered some attenuating factors. 128 One ofthe cases cited
was Johnson v. State, 129 in which the Court ofAppeals held
as voluntary a confession that was given three days after a
statement that had been involuntarily induced by an improper
promise. The voluntary confession three days laterwas given
to another officer at another place, and neither the officernor
the defendant mentioned the improper promise. 130
Neither Winder nor Johnson discussed prior
Maryland cases that had adopted amore stringent (' 'defendantfriendly') rule ofcausation. For example, in 1950 in Edwanis
v. State, the Court examined the effect of an improper
inducement on two subsequent statements made two hours
and thirteen hours, respectively, after the first confession was
improperly induced by a promise. 131 The Court stated that
the "improper influence which produced the first confession
is presumed to still be in effectuntil a cessation ofthat influence
is definitely shown, and the evidence to overcome and
rebut such a presumption must be clem; strong, and
satisfactOty, and any doubt on this point is resolved in
favor ofthe accused. "132 The Court suppressed the second
and third confessions. Also, in Kier v. State, the Court, citing
Edwards, suppressed a second confession madefourteen
days after the first improperly induced confession. 133 Edwards
and Kier, however, might be distinguished because they
involved the effect ofan improper inducement and a prior
confession upon a subsequent confession.
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In 1996 in Martin v. State, the Court of Special
Appeals offered a more precise description ofthe necessary
measure of causation: "Ifthe inducement is shown to have
some, even ifonly slight, influence on a subsequent confession,
the per se exclusion approach creates a conclusive
presumption that the influence was dispositively catalytic and
relieves the defendant ofthe burden ofshowing that his will
was in fact overborne by such influence. "134
The Supreme Court ofMichigan in People v. Conte,
an opinion with a nearly identical per se test as Hillani, held
that a promise "must have more than an attenuated causal
connection with the confession, but need not be the only or
even principal motivating factor."135 The Supreme Court of
Mississippi, which also has an exclusionary rule as expansive
as Hillard, uses the term "proximate cause"136 to measure
the influence ofthe improper promise upon the subsequent
statement.
5. Did Winder Narrow The Definition ofAn Improper
Promise?

The WInder Court may have narrowed the definition
ofan improper promise by defining it as "special consideration
from a prosecuting authority or some other form of
assistance in exchange for the suspect's confession .... "137
The Hillard Court had stated a broader definition - "help or
some special consideration' '-without mentioning "prosecuting
authority. "138
This arguably narrowed definition in Winder is
consistent with an older, and subsequently abandoned, line
of Maryland cases from 1961 to 1965. In 1961 in Presley
v. State, the Court of Appeals stated that the State must
prove that a confession was not caused by a "promise, threat
or inducement whereby the accused might be led to believe
that there would be a partial or total abandonment of
prosecution."139 In several subsequent cases 140 the Court
restated this narrowed definition until it appeared for the last
time in 1965 in Smith v. State. 141
This narrower definition of an improper promise is
consistent with Hopt v. Utah, the Supreme Court's first case
on connnon-law vo1untariness. 142 In Hopt, the Supreme Court
held that a confession is involuntary ifmade "in consequence
ofinducemen1s ... touching the charge prejen-ed. "143 Even
in 1897 inBram v. United States, Hillard's ancestral role
model, the Supreme Court reiterated this qualification that
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the improper influence must relate to the "crime charged. "144
Furthennore, this narrowed definition is arguably consistent
with the Court's statement in Reynolds v. State that,
"[g]enerally the type ofinducernents that rendered confessions
inadmissible at common law were inducements extreme
enough to make confessions unreliable and which directly
impacted on the accused or the crime chmged."145
1bis narrowed definition is also consistent with recent
sociological studies indicating that rninor prornises, which do
not offer substantial help with the suspect's sentence or
likelihood of acquittal, are unlikely to produce a false
confession. Professor Welsh White, who has written several
articles criticizing police promises, threats, and deception,
concluded that:
As Wigmore observed, the premise that
confessions produced by any promises are
untrustworthy was probably never
con'ect. If the inducement to confess is
relatively slight - a promise that the officer
will testify that the suspect cooperated, for
example - there is little reason to believe
that a suspect will respond with a false
confession ... [However, regarding] a
promise of significant leniency, empirical
data as well as intuition suggest that even an
innocent suspect will be quite likely to
confess rather than risk the consequences
ofmaintaining his innocence. 146

Some language in Winder, however, suggests the
contrary. The Court's use ofthe phrase "or some other foml
of assistance" could be interpreted as a reaffimmtion of an
expansive definition of an improper promise. The Court did
not expressly couple this phrase with the qualifier, "from a
prosecuting authority. "147 With the exception ofthe cases
discussed above from 1961 to 1965, and the dicta in
Reynolds, the Court of Appeals has consistently applied a
broaddefmition of an improper promise, For example, in
Nicholson v. State, 148 the Court defined an improper promise
as "any promise of worldly advantage." The Court repeated
the Nicholson definition in Reynolds, 149 HoJI50 and WInde,: 151
In 1980 the Court in Stokes v. State broadly stated that the
"rule in Hillard announces that a statement is rendered

involuntary if it is induced by any official promise which
redounds to the benefit or desire ofthe defendant. "152
One court in recent years has broadly interpreted an
improper promise to include a material benefit unassociated
with the pending case. The Court of Special Appeals in In re
Joshua David C. quoted the Nicholson definition in holding
that an officer's promiseofa tee shirt to a ten-year-oldchild
rendered the subsequent statement involuntary. 153
a. What is an Implied Promise?

The Winder Court established an "obj ective" test
for detennining whether the police actually communicated a
direct or implied promise. First, a statement will not be
suppressedjust because the defendant sincerely believed that
he would receive some benefit for his confession, without
any evidence that his beliefwas reasonably "premised on a
statement or action made by an interrogating officer."154
Second, the Winder Court held that, "[a]lthough a defendant
need not point to an express quidpro quo, ... a promise or
offer within the substance ofthe officer's eliciting statement"
is required. 15S Third, the Court may have narrowed the
definition ofan improper promise by not adopting language
from previous cases that any' 'promise, however slight" would
constitute an inducement. 156
The Court of Appeals has most often analyzed an
inlpliedpromise in the context ofthe police statement, "it would
be better for the defendant to talk." In Ball v. State, the
Court held as voluntary the defendant's written version of a
prior oral confession, despite the detective's statement that it
wouldbe "much better if you told the StOIY ... tothejury ..
. so thatitis your words not mine .. .. " 157 111Ralph v. State,
the Court ofAppeals suggested that when there is no improper
police statement or action, otherthan the admonition, "it is
better to tell the truth," an improper promise will not be
found. 158 In Deems v. State, the police statement, "the truth
would hurt no one," was not an improper inducement. 159
Similarly, the Court of Special Appeals in In re Owen F
found no implied promise when the officer told a fourteenyear-old with an IQ ono, "I think itis better if you tell me."160
However, in Biscoe v. State the statement, "it would
be better to tell the truth. , . and have no more trouble about
it," was held to bean inlproperpromise-one "ofthe strongest
kind. "161 In Dobbs v. State, the prosecutor sstatement, "Tell
the truth. You have nothing to fear, if you weren't in it," was
32.1 U. BaIt. L.F. 17
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held to be an implied promise. 162 In Lubinski v. State, the
Court of Appeals stated that the police statement, "It will
help you a lot [ifyou give a statement]" would be an improper
inducement. 163 In In reLucas F, the Court ofSpecial Appeals
held that the exhortation to tell the truth, "so there would be
no problen1Iater," was improper. l64 ChiefJudge Gilbert wrote
that the exhortation sowed the "seeds of a subauditur in the
[ten-year-old defendant's] mind thatifhe related the events
that transpired ... he would avoid subsequent problems. "165
Studies do indeed show that implied promises of
leniency may be interpreted in almost the same way as direct
promises. Suspects process information "between the lines."I66
Thus, the "difference between expressions ofcompassionate
understanding on the one hand, and implied promises of
leniency on the other, is at the margins sometimes a matter of
emphasis and nuance. "167
b. Qualified Promises - Implied, Improper Promises
Accompanied by the Warning that Nothing Can Be
Promised.

Another difficult issue arises when the police warn
the suspect that the police cannot make any promises, and
then proceed to make an implied promise. In 1887 in Biscoe
v. State, the interrogator told the defendant he could make
no promises to the defendant, but then told the defendant, ''It
would be better for him to tell the truth, and have no more
trouble about it. "168 The Court of Appeals observed, "But
what does this amountto when, in the next breath, we find
him [making a promise]?"169 The Court held the subsequent
confessiontobeinvoluntaty. However, in 1958 in Merdtant
v. State, the Court ofAppeals held that because the defendant
was told that anything he said can be used against him, there
couldbe no improper promise implied in the police statement,
"The truth hurts no one."170
In 1990 the Court of Special Appeals in Watters v.
State held that certain implied promises were not improper
because the officer repeatedly reminded the defendant that
he could not promise him anything. 171 The officer told the
defendant, "I can't promise that you are going to walk out of
j ail, okay? ... I am giving you the opportunity to tell us what
you knOw. I can't say whether that is going to help you, I
can't say that itis not going to help you, because I am not in
thatposition."172 Most recently, the Court of Special Appeals
in Minehan v. State held that a suspect "could not reasonably
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believe the officers would ensure his case was handled with
leniency" because the police warned the suspect several times
that the police could "not promise [him] anything. "173
c. Short of a Promise to Advocate for Leniency, a
Promise to Tell the Prosecutor or Judge of the
Defendant's Cooperation

In Hillard v. State, the Court found a statement
involuntary which was made in reliance upon the officer's
promise "to go to bat" for the defendant with the
prosecutor. 174 However, the Court has never directly ruled
on a promise simply to inform the prosecutor or judge ofthe
defendant's cooperation, without promising to advocatefor
leniency. In Winder, the Court ofAppeals characterized the
various improper offers ofhelp made to the defendant by
three different officers as fo Hows: "to contact the prosecuting
authorities in order to provide him leniency during his
subsequent prosecution. The officers purportedly would cany
out their offers by advocating on Appellant's behalf to the
state's attorney and the judge presiding over his anticipated
trial."175
In Grammer v. Statein 1953, the Court ofAppeals
implied that a promise to tell the judge of the defendant's
cooperation might be problematic. The officer told the suspect
that "at the time ofcourt ... it would be testified to that he had
cooperated with us in making a statement."176 However,
because the questionable promise was made after the
confession, the court did not have to rule on whether there
was an improper promise. 177 In Hall v. State, the Court of
Appeals expressly declined to rule on a sin1ilar question.178
In contrast, in Boyer v. State, the Court of Special
Appeals held that it was not improper for the officer to tell the
defendantthatthe officer would tell the prosecutor ofthe
defendant's cooperation. 179 Similarly, Professor White, who
has written extensively on the problem of false confessions,
conceded that this type of promise is unlikely to lead to a
false confession. 180 The overwhelming majority ofstates has
held that promises ofthis nature are not improper. lSI
d. Promises of a Material Item, Unrelated to the Case

The Court in Reynolds v. State noted that
"[p]romises ofpurely collateral benefits do not generally reach
a level that undermines the voluntariness ofa confession. "182
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In In re Joshua David c., the Court of Special Appeals
applied the common-law exclusionmy rule to an involuntary
confession made by a ten-year-old who was promised a tee
shirt.l83 The court cited Nicholson v. State, which prohibited
a "promise of worldly advantage."184 In 1968 in Lyter v.
State, an implied promise to help the defendant get a job
when he got out ofjail was held to be improper.185 InMitchell
v. State, the defendant alleged that the police promised to
return the defendant's car to his wife. 186 The Court ofSpecial
Appeals did not have to analyze the promise about the car
because the trial court believed the officers' testimony that
they had offered no inducements.
e. Promises Regarding Bail

Although no Maryland appellate court has squarely
held that promises related to bail are improper, there are ample
dicta to indicate that such promises would be improper. The
Hillard Court did not specifically hold that the improper
promise "to go to bat" with the prosecutor related to bail.
However, the trial judge appeared to find that the promise
related to the question ofbond. 187 Similarly, the Court of
Special Appeals in Whack v. State stated that "promises to
reduce bail ... may act to vitiate the voluntariness of a
confession."188 In Ponds v. State, the Court of Special
Appeals stated the confession would have been involuntaI)' if
the trial court had believed the defendant's allegations that
the police would recommend "personal bond" in exchange
for coopemtion. 189
However, in Pharr v. State, although the court did
not have to decide the propriety of a police promise to get
the defendant out on bond, the court did not explicitly state
that such a promise was improper. 190 Furthennore, regarding
a detective's effort to convince the defendantthat he was not
in custody, the Court of Special Appeals in In re Etic F held
that it was not an improper promise for the detective to tell a
suspect that whatever the suspect said, the suspect would
"go home ... thatnight."191
f. Promises Regarding Counseling (not in lieu of

punishment)

What ifthe police promise psychological assistance

The Winder Court, however, did indicate that the
following police statement was an improper inducement "We
think the person who committed these [acts] needs help. I
think you need help. The only way we can get you that help
is for you to let us know what happened. We can let the
State's Attorney's Office know .... "192 The Court
characterized the officer's statement as a promise to help
''with obtaining psychological assistance and leniency from
the prosecuting authority. "193 In Johnson v. State, the Court
found that a statement was "properly suppressed" because it
had been induced by a promise ofpsychological treatment. 194
There, the trooper stated that if the defendant confessed to
themurder''hemightbeabletoreceivesomesortof'medical
treatment at Perkins' instead ofbeing 'locked up for the rest
of [his] life ... .' "195
g. Promises Regarding Privacy

In 1937 in Marldey v. State, the Court ofAppeals
didnot find improper a police promisetokeep1he defendant's
name out ofthe "published statements on the case. "196 The
Court held that an assumnce of secrecy, short of a promise
notto prosecute, does not render a confession inadmissible. 197
In 1943 in Ford v. State, the Court ofAppeals did not find
improper a promise to tear up the detective's notes at the end
of the interrogation. 198 However, a promise to keep a
defendant's statement confidential, beyond the narrow
holdings of Markley and Ford, will surely result in an
involuntaI)' statement.
h. Promises to Help (Not to Harm) a Non-Relative
Friend in Legal Matters

In 1980 the Court of Appeals in Stokes v. State
held as improper a "promise not to harm (physically or
emotionally) a near relative with whom the defendant naturally
has a close bond of affection. "199 The Court specifically left
open the issue of what "degree ofcloseness" the defendant
must have with anon-relative friend who is the subject ofthe
police promise or threat.2° o However, in 2002 the Court of
Appeals in Pringle v. State held, in the context of a Fourth
Amendment "attenuation" analysis, that a threatnotto arrest
a non-relative, co-defendant would constitute a "coercive"

dwingthe suspect's eventual j ail sentence rather than in lieu
ofit? The Court of Appeals has not addressed this issue.
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"inducement' '20 1 and, thus, implied that the subsequent
confession was involuntary.
The Court of Special Appeals in Bellamy v. State
extended the exclusionary rule of Stokes regarding near
relatives to a promise to help the defendant's fiance. 202 In
Fowlerv. State, 203 the Court of Special Appeals held that a
detective's exhortation to disclose the co-defendant's name,
so that "the weight could be shared," was an improper
inducement. However, the court found that the confession
was admissible because the defendant had not relied on the
inducement. In Jarrell v. State, the Court ofSpecial Appeals
held, in the context of consent to search under the Fourth
Amendment, that the police promise to release a sick friend
from jail caused the consentto be involuntary.2M
The Supreme Court in Spano v. New York, although
in the due process context, held as involuntary a confession
induced by the police officer's statement that the police officer
would probably lose his job ifthe defendant did not confess. 205
The Court held that the defendant's sympathy was "falsely
aroused" because the interrogating officer was a childhood
friend ofthe defendant. 206
i. Promises to Help a 'Wear Relative" in Non-Legal
Matters

In Stokes v. State, the Court of Appeals left open
the possibility that itmay be improper to promise to help a
"near" relative with matters not pertaining to the pending case
orto any other case. 207 The Court held as improper a "promise
not to harm (physically or emotionally) a near relative with
whom the defendant naturally has a close bond ofaifection''208
A unaninlous Supreme Court in Lynumn v. Illinois, although
a due process case., held a confession to be involuntary after
the police told an arrested defendant that ifshe didnotconfess,
her two children would be taken from her by the State, and
her welfare payments would be cut off.209
hl Reynolds v. State, the Court of Appeals found
no impropriety with the police exhortation to the defendantto
ten the truth in order to help the defendant's daughter, the
victim, with her self-doubt over the prospect of no one
believing her allegations of sexual abuse against the
defendant.2 l0 TIle Court labeled this promise as "col1ateral"
because the statement had not "directly impacted" the
defendant. The Court emphasized that the benefit of the
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promise was not somethingthatthe "police would or would
not do if the defendant made a statement. "211
The Court of Special Appeals in Finke v. State also
found no impropriety with a similar police exhortation that the
defendant should admit the crime to spare his three-year-old
grandson the necessity of having to testify against the
defendant. 212 ill Boyd v. State, the defendant asked to see
her children before executing a written statement?13 The officer
responded that she would be all owed to see her children
after she completed and signed a written statement. 214 In
holding that this was not an improper inducement, the Court
ofSpecial Appeals stated, "[w]e know ofno right on the part
ofa suspect in a murder case to interruptthe interview process
in order that the suspect may visit with his or her children
before continuing with the interrogation.''215 The Texas Court
ofCriminal Appeals in Muniz v. State, found no inlpropriety
with an officer's promises to get heIp from charities for
defendant's pregnant wife and sick mother.216
j. False Friend Scenario and Promises to Investigate

Any Leads That The
Defendant Provides in an Exculpatory Statement
In a case decided several months before Hillard,
the Court of Special Appeals in Rowe v. State examined a
police statement that the victim was a "no-good-son-of-abitch ... and that the only thing that [the detective] wanted to
do real1y was to shake the hand of the man that murdered
him ... .''217 The court held that this was not improper because
the defendant could not have reasonably interpreted the
statement as a "preliminary pardon.''218 Even a noted critic of
many modern police interrogation techniques, Professor
AlbertAlschuler, has acknowledged that the police "should
be allowed to express false sympathy for the suspect, [and]
blamethevictim.''219
In Finke v. State, the Court of Special Appeals
examined the police promise to investigate any leads the
defendant provided. The court held that this promise was
not improper because, ifit has any effect at aU, it would induce
an exculpatory statement. 220 The Court of Special Appeals
came to the same conclusion on a similar set offacts in Clark
v. State. 221
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k. False Statements or Unfulfilled Promises Which Are
Othenvise Proper

Generally, the Court of Appeals has held that
deception, except "an overbearing inducement, is a 'valid
weapon of the police arsenal. '''222 With respect to police
deception, Maryland appellate courts apply the
constitutional due process test of whether the defendant's
will was overborne under the totality ofthecircumstances. 223
However, if the police lie about the law,224 the resulting
confession will likely be deemed involuntary, especially ifthe
lie pertains to the suspect's constitutional rights.225
In Ford v. State, the Court of Appeals held that a
"breach offaith" regarding a promise to tear up the detective's
notes afterthe defendant confessed was not sufficient to render
the confession involuntary.226 In Mitchell v. State, the Court
of Special Appeals stated in dicta that it was not a significant
factor in the voluntariness inquiry that the police did not follow
through on their pronrise to getthe defendant a reduction in
bail. 227
However, Professor White has argued that false or
unfulfilled promises, which would otherwise not be improper,
should not be pennissible and should render a subsequent
confession involuntary. He analogized this situation with a
defendant's rightto withdraw a guilty plea when the State has
breached its end of the plea bargain.228

Professors Richard Ofshe and Richard Leo claim that this
technique has played a partin eliciting some false confessions
because the technique "relies on communicating a promise of
leniency for its efficacy."232
m. Promises Initiated by the Defendant
In Hillard, the defendant's attorney appeared to have
initiated the idea of the detective "going to bat" for the
defendant. However, the Court did not mention this as a
factor in finding involuntary a confession which resulted from
the same promise made later by the detective.233 The Court
ignored this factor and held that the detective's promise
rendered the resulting confession involuntary. The Court of
Special Appeals in Jones v. State held a confession to be
involuntary even though the defendant initiated the subject of
the police getting him "help. "234 Similarly, in Bellamy v. State,
even though the defendant initiated the subject, the Court of
Special Appeals held as involuntary a confession induced by
a promise of help to secure the release of the defendant's
fiance.235
However, the Court of Special Appeals in Mitchell
v. State stated that an important factor in holding that there
were no improper inducements was that the "defendant
volunteered to give information about [another case] in return
for certain things that he requested the police do for him. "236
Several states have relaxed the per se rule on this basis.237

I. Encouraging a Suspect to Adopt an "Accidental"

Theory of the Case or to Admit to a Lesser Crime
The ploy to encourage a suspect to admit to an
accidental theory ofthe case was unarumously upheld in 1997
by the Court ofAppeals in a death penalty case. In Ball v.
State, the Court upheld the technique of presenting the
defendant with two opposing versions the facts. 229 The first
version presented the defendant as a diabolical criminal. The
second version presented the defendant as a loving father,
who had a ''tough life," and who shot the victim accidentally.230
TIle Court classified this technique as a permissible fonn of
deception, rather than an implied promise ofleniency and,
thus, applied a "totality of the circumstances" test.
In Smith v. State, the Court of Special Appeals
held that the police statement, "the Court might take into
consideration a version by the accused of the fire being
accidental," was not an improper inducen1ent. 231 Nonetheless,

n. Confession Induced By Valid Plea Agreement
Between an Unrepresented Defendant and the
Prosecutor.
In 1986 the Court of Appeals in Wright v. State
held as voluntary a statement of an unrepresented defendant
which was induced by a plea bargain negotiated with a
prosecutor shortly after the defendant was arrested. 238
Because the defendant specifically agreed that any of his
statements made as part of the plea bargain, pursuant to
Maryland Rule 4-243, would be admissible in the eventthat
he withdrew fromtheplea,the Courtheldthatthese statements
were admissible, as long as the State honored its end ofthe
bargain?39 The Court conceded the next year that its decision
in Wright was in the minority when compared to other
jurisdictions around the country.240
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6. Should Courts Consider the Likelihood of Certain
Police Practices Causing an Unreliable or even False
Confession?

The likelihood of producing a false confession was
the controlling test for the admissibility of confessions at
conmlon law in England after the Restomtion in 1660.241 The
Court in ReylWlds observed that "[t]he common law approach
was to identifY inducements that might make a confession
unreliable or even false. "242 For a limited number of years in
Maryland, between 1925 and 1943, the truthfulness of a
confession was an important factor in the determination of
voluntariness. In 1928 in Carey v. State, the Court ofAppeals
held that the "ultimate test to be applied in detennining the
admissibility ofthe statement" is: "Was the situation produced
by that evidence such that there was a reasonable probability
that the accused would make a false statement or confession
... ?"243
Although the Court of Appeals has often explained
that one underlyingmtionale ofthe common-law rule is that a
"promise of some benefit is, of course, inherently
untrustworthy,"244 the Court, since these early cases, has not
actually examined the reliability ofa particular confession, or
the likeliliood that a particular police tactic would produce an
unreliable confession. However, the Court ofAppeals has
not explicitly forbidden, under the common law, an analysis
of the truthfubless ofthe confession, as the Supreme Court
has done with respect to the due process analysis.245
In the past six years, there has been a wave of
scholarly articles concerning the phenomenon of false
confessions. 246 In one such study, Professors Ofshe and Leo
analyzed sixty proven false, orprobably false, confessions. 247
Out ofthe thirty-threeproven false confessions, only eighteen
(55%) were discovered before trial, five (15%) plead guilty,
nine (27%) were convicted at trial, and only one (3 %) was
acquitted. 248 Sixteen out of the sixty involved cognitively
disabled defendants. 249 In the Washington D. C. area, the public
awareness ofthe possibility ofa false confession has increased
as a result of a series of articles in the Washington Post on
the lengthy, inconmmnicado interrogations sometimes
employed in Prince George's County.250
Despite this heightened concern, the scholarly litemture
has only produced a relatively small number ofdocumented
false confessions which "can be explained ... primarily on
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the ground that the interrogator's promise provoked the
suspect's confession. "251 Furthennore, there is "no sound
empirical proofthat such instances are widespread ''252 Even
Ofshe and Leo concede that there has been no research' 'to
quantifY the number and frequency offalse confessions or the
mte at which they lead to miscarriages ofjustice.' '253
Professor White has advocated that trial judges
should evaluate the likeliliood that a particular police tactic, in
geneml, would produce a false confession. 254 The OfsheILeo
article, which examined sixty purportedly false confessions,
advocated thatjudges actually examine the reliability ofeach
confession, provided that a videotape regime is in place.255
The latter proposal has been widely criticized as being
unworkable and invading the traditional role of the fact
finder.256
Judge Andrew Sonner recently suggested, in a
dissenting opinion, the unreliability ofa confession as a factor
in examining an alleged threat to arrest the defendant's
companions.257 Professor Magid, a critic ofanecdotal studies
purporting to show widespread instances offalseconfessions,
nonetheless concedes that, at least with respect to deceptive
police practices, "[t]here is a growing view that reliability is
the appropriate focus of the debate."258
D. The Jury Instruction on Voluntariness - Should the
Jury Apply a Common-Law or Due Process Test?

A jury in Maryland must decide two issues in
considering a confession: its voluntariness and its reliability.259
In 1976 in Dempsey v. State, the Court ofAppeals, speaking
through Judge Eldridge, restated these two roles: "'[The jury]
has the final detennination, irrespective of the court's
preliminary decision, whether or not the confession is
voluntary, and whether it should be believed. '" 260
The State's burden to prove voluntariness to the jury
is not constitutionally required. 261 Since at least 1947,262
the Court of Appeals has required this "greater safeguard,"
known as the "Massachusetts Rule,"263 in order to further
Maryland's "strong public policy" against the use ofinvoluntary
confessions.264 As such, the jury must decide voluntariness
beyond a reasonable doubt before it even considers the
reliability, or ''weight,'' ofa confession. 265
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The instruction for the "Statement oIDefendant" in
the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, 3: 18,
MICPEL, states:
The State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statement was freely and
voluntarily made. A voluntary statement is
one that, under all circumstances, was given
freely .... To be voluntary it must have not
been compelled or obtained as a result of
any force, promises, threats, inducements
or offers ofreward .... In deciding whether
the statement was voluntary, consider all of
the circumstances surrounding the statement
.... If you find beyond a reasonable doubt
thatthe statement was voluntary, give it such
weight as you believe it deserves.
In considering voluntariness, should the jury apply the
common-law or due process test, or both? The instruction
leaves this and other questions unresolved.
First, the instruction does not clarifY how the jury
can reconcile the inherenttension between the third sentence,
which generally encapsulates the conm10n-Iaw per se rule,
and the second and fourth sentences, which generally refer to
a modified due process, ''totality ofthe circumstances" teSt. 266
Second the two most recent cases from the Court ofAppeals
seem to provide conflicting dicta in relation to this question.
In 1995 in Hof v. State,267 the Court seemed to favor a
modified due process, ''totality ofthe circun1Stances" approach
for the jury. However, in 1986 in Brittingham v. State, the
COUlt seemed to endorse the per se approach by favorably
quoting, among other cases, a 1948 case, Smith v. State,
that had explicitly applied the per se common-law test to the
jUly'S role in determining voluntariness.268
Third, the instruction does not provide a definition
for a "voluntary" statement beyond the assertion that it is a
statement that is "freely" given. Fourth, the instruction omits
important clarifYing language from both the common-law and
due process tests. With respect to the due process test, the
instruction does not contain commonly quoted language, such
as "coerced," "overborne will," or "capacity for selfdetermination [being] critically in1paired. "269 With respectto
the common-law test, the instruction does not define improper

promises orthreats, nor does it mention "implied" promises
or threats.
Fifth, the instruction does not mention whether the
voluntariness determination needs to be unanimous. For
example, the instruction does not provide guidance on what
might happen ifthejury disagreed on which test to apply or if
the jury was hung on the voluntariness issue.270
As presently written, defense attorneys can argue to
jurors thatthey should focus on the "mandatory" nature of
the third sentence - that the jury "must" find a confession
invohmtary ifit was obtained as a result ofany police promise
(not necessarily one that the Court of Appeals would define
as "improper'). Defense attorneys can argue that, nrespective
ofthe lack ofa "compe1[ing]" or coercive influence of the
promise, the jury should disregard the confession "obtained
as a result of' the promise. Ofcourse, the prosecutor would
respond that the jury "must" consider the "totality of the
circumstances," pursuant to the fourth sentence of the
instruction, not just the cause-and-effect of a promise.
Without further clarification from the trial judge, jurors could
easily consider both argun1ents to be reasonable interpretations
ofthe instruction, thus creating a greater likeliliood ofa divided
jury on the question ofvoluntariness.
This defense attorneys' argument is supported by
the majority of the case law in Maryland. As mentioned
above, the Court in Brittingham seemed to endorse the jury's
use of the per se test. 271 Also, in three cases from 1948 to
1960, the Court seemed to sanction the per se test for the
jury's consideration ofvoluntariness. 272
Furthennore, because the Court has expressly
sanctioned 'JUlY reconsideration of the trial court's
determination,"273 it can be argued that the jury should
reconsider the two voluntariness tests in the same order that
the trial court must consider them - with the per se test
conducted prior to and separate from the due process
test. 274 Thus, pursuantto this formulation, ifthe jury found the
confession involuntary under the per se test, it would not need
to consider the due process test.
Lastly, there is some empirical support for the role of
the per setest in protecting the defendant against jurors who
are skeptical that improper promises can cause an involuntary
or unreliable statement. 275 In Confessions in the
Courtroom, 276 the authors conducted five empirical studies
of jurors' reactions to promises and threats leading to a
confession. The results consistently indicated that jurors
32.1 U. Balt. L.F. 23
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perceive 1hat a confession induced by a promise ofleniency is
less suspectthan a confession induced by a threat ofsevere
consequences. These results were consistent wi1h previous
studies in which "people attribute more responsibility and
freedom to a person for actions taken to gain a positive
outcome than for similar actions aimed at avoiding
punishment. "277 The authors concluded that this "positive
coercion bias" can, and should, be corrected wi1h an instruction
to the jury aboutthe coercive effect of certain promises. 278
Because it appears that 1he jury must reconsider the
trial judge's ruling on the per se test (either by itself or in
conjunction with the due process test), the trial court should
give a more detailed instruction on the elements of1he commonlaw test. For instance, the trial court should instruct on which
types ofpromises are deemed inlproper, and then proceed to
explain the per se nature of the causation prong.279
However, even if the per se test were explained in
more detail to the jury, this would not alleviate the inherent
tension in the instruction: How does the jury reconcile the per
se test with the ''totality'' test? Should the jury be instructed
that the common-law per se test should be applied prior to
the "totality" test, as is mandated for a judge at the threshold
stage ofadmissibility? Or should 1hejury merely be instructed
that a promise can be coercive, but1he jury should still consider
a promise as only one critical factor in the totality of the
circumstances? lfMaryland were to adoptthis latter approach,
the jury would essentially apply a modified due process
analysis.
Such a modified due process, "totality of the
circumstances" test is supported by the Court's most recent
case on the jury's evaluation ofvoluntariness. TheHofCourt
seemed to endorse the due process, "totality of the
circumstances" test where it traditionally had not applied - in
conjunction with 1he common-law rule ofHillard:
In detennining whether a confession is
plagued wi1h any "coercive ba171acles, ""the
standard is whether, under the totality of1he
circUlllstances, 1he statement was given freely
and voluntarily" .... Otherwise stated, the
test of admissibility of [a] confession is
whether [the will of the accused] was
overborne at the time he confessed ... or
whether his statement was "freely selfdetermined .... Thus, a statement is
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voluntary if it is induced by force, undue
influence, impmperpromises, including any
official promise which redounds to the
benefit or desire of the defendant. "280
The Court also emphasized another aspect of the
voluntariness test which is not typically as important in the per
se test: "The critical focus in an involuntariness inquiry is the
defendant's state of mind. "281 Thus, as a result of the above
quoted language, the Court appeared to eschew a jury
instruction for voluntariness that is dominated by the per se
test.
Furthennore, it can be argued that the deterrence
rationale, which is one ofthe underlying rationales ofthe per
se test, at the threshold level of admissibility, does not seem
appropriate at the jury level. As Judge Moylan observed,
"[i]t is not the job of a jury 'to police the police. '''282 The
Court ofAppeals in both Blittingham283 andHof84 observed
thatthepwposebehindthejury'sconsiderationofvoluntariness
appears to be the "reliability" ofthe statement, rather than "to
protect against government overreaching"285 - the deterrence
rationale underlying1he exclusionary rule at1he threshold level
of admissibility. Certain studies have shown that some
improper promises that are forbidden by the conmlon-Iaw
rule (short ofpromises ofsignificant leniency) are not likely to
cause unreliable confessions.286 Thus, applying the COlmnonlaw test, jurors will more often face the difficult task to
"disregard a trustworthy, albeit involuntary, confession (1he
thing that Jackson v. Denno said a jury was incapable of
doing)."287 The "totality ofthe circumstances test" makes it
less likely1hatjuroTS will face this problem identified in Jackson.
Lastly, the defendant may not need the extra
protections of the persetest. The defendant already enjoys
several protections against unreliable statements at the
threshold level of admissibility: the per se common-law
voluntariness test itself, the due process voluntariness test,
Miranda, and 1he Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 288 TIle
latter two protections did not exist from 1948 through 1960
when the Court of Appeals seemed to endorse the per se
approach for the jury.289
In conclusion, a middle ground between the two
approaches can be found in Reynolds v. State, in which the
Court quoted the Second Circuit's holding1hatthe voluntariness
"inquiry in each case is whether such a promise overbears the
suspect's will ... either alone or in conjunction with other
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factors.' '290 Thus, a' 'compromise" instruction should inform
the jury that they could find the defendant's will to be
overborne as a result of merely one improper promise
because certain promises of leniency, especially with
incarcerated defendants, can be highly coercive. Next, the
jury should be instructed that ifthey do not believe that the
promise alone caused an overborne will, they should consider
other factors in the totality ofthe circumstances in determining
voluntariness?91

m. Conclusion
The Court of Appeals made clear in Winder and
Williams that it will apply a more restrictive application of
the "totality of the circumstances" approach to certain
improper promises. The Court of Appeals will presume
coercion by essentially engaging in a cause-and-effect analysis,
which has little, ifanything, to do with whether the defendant's
will was actually ovemome. However, many issues still remain
unclear.
While the case law slowly develops so as to fill in
some of the ambiguities in the common-law standard in
Mal)'land, defense attorneys and prosecutors can be assured
that there are many arguments to be made on both sides with
respect to most confessions. Practitioners can be assured
that there are even more creative arguments to be made under
Miranda, the Sixth Amendment, and the due process right
to an attorney and to silence. Confession law is indeed far
more complicated than expected
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Williams v. State did not repeat Winder oS language conceming
a "custodial confession" when commenting on the commonlaw rule. Williams v. State, No. 69. Sept. Term, 2002, 2003
WL 21361726, at * 14 (Md. June 13,2003).
90

See 147 Md. App. 432, 444-47,809 A.2d 66, 72-74, cert.
denied, 372 Md. 431, 813 A.2d258 (2002).

91

92

See 289 Md. at 158-60,423 A.2d at 554-55.

93

See id. at 157,423 A.2d at 553.

82

362 Md. at 307, 312, 765A.2d at 114, 117 (emphasis added).

Welsh Wllite, Confessions Induced by Broken
Government Promises, 43 DUKE L. l 947,963 n.1 06 (1994).

83

337 Md. at 596-597,655 A.2d at 377-78.

95 113 Md. App at 229,686 A.2d at 1149 (emphasis added).

94

TIle Court might have applied so few factors, in part, because
the police conduct in Winder went "far beyond that in any of
our prior cases where improper inducements were
recognized." 362 Md. at 317,765 A.2d at 120. However, the
Comt, in dicta in Williams v. State, No. 69, Sept. Term, 2002,
2003 WL 21361726, at *14 (Md. June 13,2003), indicated no
retreat fi'om a strict cause-and-effect analysis of improper
promises and threats.

84

85

See 113 Md. App. at 231, 686 A.2d at 1150.

86

See id. at 309, 765 A.2d at 115.

87

327 Md. at 507,610 A.2d at 788.

881d. at 505,610 A.2d at 787 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). Because the Court in Reynolds held that no improper
inducements were made, the Court did not actually apply
the common-law per se rule to the non-custodial statements.
327 Md. at 509,511,610 A.2d at 789, 790.
89

See 116 Md. App. 509, 517, 698 A.2d 1121, 1125 (1997).

96 362 Md. at 320 n.21, 765 A.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
97

See id. at 309, 765 A.2d at 115.

98ld. at 320 n.21, 765 A.2d at 121.

99499 U.S. at 285-86 (quoting Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43).
100

See 346 Md. at 266, 696 A.2d at 449-50.

101

See 140 Md. App. at 158, 780 A.2d at 337-38.

102

See 141 Md. App. at 186,784 A.2d at 676-77.

103 See Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 252, 513 A.2d 299,
309-10 (1986); Gilliam v. State, 320 Md. 637, 650, 579 A.2d
744,750 (1990); HoI, 337 Md. at595-96, 655 A.2d at 377-78;
Johnson v. State, 348 Md. 337, 351,703 A.2d 1267, 1275-76
(1998) (totality of the circwnstances only mentioned in context
of the Supreme Court's due process cases). The one exception
is Hoey v. State, 311 Md. 473, 483, 536A.2d 622,627 (1988),
in which the Court mentions the "totality of the circumstances"
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in determining "whether particular police conduct is deemed
improper."
104

38 Md. at 153.

105 See Deems v. State, 127 Md. 624,630, 96 A. 878, 880
(1916); Hammondv. State, 174Md. 347,355, 198A. 704,707
(1938); Kier v. State, 213 Md. 556, 562, 132 A.2d 494,497
(1957); Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350, 353, 289 A.2d 575, 577
(1972); Hoey, 311 Md. at483, 536A.2d at 627. See Williams
v. State, No. 69, Sept. Term 2002, 2003 WL 21361726, at * 14
(Md. June 13,2003).
106

289 Md. at 161, 423 A.2d at 555. However, the Court in

Ball v. State, 347 Md. at 175,699 A.2d at 1178-79, classified
the threat in Stokes as "a promise that the suspect's wife
would not be arrested."
107

362 Md. at 311, 765 A.2d at 116 (emphasis added).

108

97 Md. App. at 273,629 A.2d at 1267.

109 !d. (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 148).
110 Nancy S. Forster and Michael R. Braudes, The Common
Law of Maryland, An Important and Independent Source
of Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. III., No.2 1. Cont.

115 See 147 Md. App. at 446-77,809 A.2d at 73-74.
116 See Kassin and McNall, supra note 66, at 242. See Conte,
365 N. W.2d at 664 ("[A] promise to a defendant guaranteeing
the release of his wife is probably more likely to induce his
confession than a promise of some benefit to him.').
117

Kassin and McNall, supra note 66, at 245-46.

118 See Passama v. State, 735 P.2d 321, 323 (Nev. 1987).
119 See 235 Md. 541, 543-44, 201 A.2d 790,791-92 (1964).
i20 See 285 Md. 705, 721-22,404A.2d 1073, 1081-82(1979).
See also United States v. Harrison, 34 F.3d 886,891-92 (9 tl1
Cir. 1994) ("There are no circumstances in which law

enforcement officers may suggest that a suspect's exercise
of the right to remain silent may result in harsher treatment by
a court or prosecutor."). See infra notes 224 and 225.
121

38 Md. at 147 (citing Russell on Crimes, 826) (emphasis
added). The Supreme Court in 1897 in Bram v. United States
later adopted the same expansive language as the defendant
argued above in Nicholson - "any degree of influence." 168
US. at 565.
122

67 Md. 6, 7, 8 A. 571, 571 (1887).

Leg. Issues, 199,209 (1992).

123 See Bram, 168 US. at 565.
III

See 370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016, cert. granted, Maryland

v. Pringle, 123 S. Ct. 1571 (2003).
112

[d.

at 532, 805 A.2d at 1019.

113 See id. at 547-554, 805 A.2d at 1028-1032. See generally
Brown v. Illinois, 422 US. 590 (1975).

114 See id. However, it can be argued that the Pringle Court's
"exploration of voluntariness," pursuant to a Fourth
Amendment attenuation analysis, was not an independent,
cOlmnon-law analysis of the voluntariness of the confession.
First, the Court did not state that it was applying Winder's
two-prong, common-law test ofvoluntariness. Second, if the
Court had been actually applying the common-law test, there
would have been no reason to apply the constitutional
"attenuation" analysis, because of the "well settled principle
'that courts should not decide constitutional issues
unnecessarily. ," Hillard, 286 Md. at 150 n.1 (citations omitted).
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124 362 Md. at 312, 765 A.2d at 117. In Williams v. State, the
Court stated that a "confession that is preceded or accompanied
by threats or a promise of advantage will be held involuntary,
... unless the State can establ ish that such threats or promises
in no way induced the confession.") (emphasis added).
Williams v. State, No. 69, Sept. Term, 2002, 2003 WL 21361726,
at * 14 (Md. June 13,2003).

125

See id. at 312-13, 318-20, 765 A.2d at 117, 120-22.

126Id. at 319, 765 A.2d at 121.
127Id. at 317, 765 A.2d at 119.
See id. (citing Ralph v. State, 226 Md. 480, 486, 174 A.2d
163, 166 (1961» (defendant did not rely on a "single, nonrepeated [police] statement," made eight hours earlier).
128
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129

See 348 Md. at 350-51, 703 A.2d at 1275-76.

130

See id. at 347-49, 703 A.2d at 1272-74.

131

194 Md. 387, 71 A.2d 487 (\950).

\32

Id. at 400, 71 A.2d at 493 (emphasis added).

147 Winder, 362 Md. at 309, 765 A.2d at 115. See accord
Williams v. State, No. 69, Sept. Term, 2002, 2003 WL21361726,
at *14 (Md. June 13,2003).

133

213 Md. 556, 563, 132 A.2d 494, 498 (1957).

148

38 Md. at 153.

White, supra note 35, at 1234-36 (emphasis added). See
supra notes 59-63.
146

134

113 Md. App. at 231, 686 A.2d at 1150.

149

See 327 Md. at 507, 610 A.2d at 788.

135

365 N.W.2d at 663.

150

See 337 Md. at 595, 655 A.2d at 377.

151

362 Md. at 309, 765 A.2d at 115.

152

289 Md. at 160, 423 A.2d at 554-55.

136 Abram, 606 So.2d at 1030. In Reynolds v. State, the
Court of Appeals favorably quoted a federal case which utilized
the concept "proximate cause." 327 Md. at 506,610 A.2d at
787-88 (quotingColev. Lane,830F.2d 104, 109 (7thCir. 1987)).

t37

362 Md. at 309, 765 A.2d at 115 (emphasis added).

138

286 Md. at 153,406 A.2d at 420. See accord Williams v.
State, No. 69, Sept. Term, 2002, 2003 WL 21361726, at * 14
(Md. June 13,2003).
139

224 Md. 550,559, 168 A.2d 510,514-15 ( 1960) (emphasis
added).

See Bryant v. State, 229 Md. 531,535, 185 A.2d 190, 192
(\ 962); Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 465, 190A.2d 797, 799
(1963); Bean v. State, 234 Md. 432, 439, 199 A.2d 773, 776
(I 964).
140

See Smith v. State, 237 Md. 573, 580, 207 A.2d 493,58081 (\ 965). However, almost as many cases from 1961 through
1963 did not adopt this narrower standard. See Parker v.
State, 225 Md. 288, 291, 170 A.2d 210, 211 (\ 961); Jones v.
State, 229 Md. 165, 170, 182A.2d 784,787 (1962); Bagley v.
State, 232 Md. 86, 92, 192 A.2d 53, 56 (1963).

141

153 See 116 Md. App. 580, 603, 698 A.2d 1155, 1166 (1997)
(quoting Nicholson, 38 Mel at 153). However, this holding
may also be explained by the concem for the greater frequency
with which children give false confessions induced by promises.
See Richard A. Leo & Richard 1. Ofshe, The Consequences
of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological
Interrogation, 88 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 458 (1998).

154 Winder, 362 Md. at 311, 765 A.2d at 116. See Stokes, 289
Md. at 162,423 A.2d at 555-56.

155

362 Md. at 311, 765 A.2d at 116.

156 See Hof, 337 Md. at 595, 655 A.2d at 377 (citations
omitted).

157

347 Md. at 174-176,699 A.2d at 1178-79.

158

226 Md. 480, 486, 174A.2d 163, 166 (1961); see Hillard,
286 Md. at 154 n.3, 406 A.2d at 420.

142

See 110 U.S. at 585.

159

127 Md. 624, 630, 96 A. 878, 880 (1916).

143

Id. (emphasis added).

160

70 Md. App. 678, 690-91, 523 A.2d 627,633 (1987).

144

168 U.S. at 549.

161

67 Md. at 8, 8 A. at 572.

162

148 Md. 34,60,129 A. 275, 285 (1925).

163

180 Md. 1,4-5,22 A.2d455, 457 (\941).

145

327 Md. at 512,610 A.2d at 790-91 (citing LaFave and
Israel, Criminal Procedure, 6.2 at 440 (1984)) (emphasis
added).
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164

68 Md. App. 97, 105,510 A.2d 270,274-75 (I 986).

165

ld.

166

Kassin and McNall, supra note 66, at 241, 245, 248.

182

327 Md. at 511,610 A.2d at 790. The COLUi noted that one
exception to the rule on collateral benefits is a threat or promise
to arrest a relative. See id. at 512, 610 A.2d at 791 (quoting
Stokes, 289 Md. at 161,423 A.2d at 555).
183

Phillip E. Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the
Miranda Doctrine, 24 AM. CRlM. L. REV. 303, 310-11 (1986).

See 116 Md. App. at 603,698 A.2d at I 166.

167

168

67 Md. at 7, 8 A. at 571.

169

!d. at 8, 8 A. at 572.

170

217 Md. 61,70, 141 A.2d 487,491-92 (1958).

See 84 Md. App. 230, 241-243, 578 A.2d 810,815-16
(I 990), rev'd on other grounds, 328 Md. 38 (1992).

184 38 Md. at 153. This same passage from Nicholson was
favorably quoted in both Winder, 362 Md. at 309,765 A.2d at
115, and Reynolds, 327 Md. at 507, 610 A.2d at 788.

185 See 2 Md. App. 654, 658-59, 236 A.2d 432, 435 (I 968)
(Murphy, C.J.).

186

See 51 Md. App. 347, 354, 443 A.2d 651,655 (1982).

187

See 286 Md. at 149,406 A.2d at 417-18.

188

94 Md. App. 107,120,615 A.2d 1226,1232-33 (1992).

189

25 Md. App. 162, 176,335 A.2d 162, 170 (I 975).

190

36 Md. App. 6 I 5,627,375 A.2d 1129, 1135 (1977).

191

116 Md. App. at 518,698 A.2d at 1125.

192

362 Md. at 314, 765 A.2d at I 18.

193

!d.

171

172

ld. at 242,578 A.2d at 815-16.

Minehan, 147 Md. App. at 444-46, 809 A.2d at 72-74,
cert. denied, 372 Md. 431, 813 A.2d258 (2002). See Facon
v. State, 144 Md. App. I, 25 (2002), rev 'd on other grounds,
No. 30, Sept. Term, 2002, 2003 WL 21361541 (Md. June 13,
2003) (The Court of Special Appeals found nothing improper
with the detective's promise to tell the prosecutor that the
defendant had a serious drug problem, in part, because the
detective emphasized to the defendant that he was "'making
no promises' about a drug treatment program.").
173

174

286 Md. at 153, 406 A.2d at 420.

194

348 Md. at 350,703 A.2d at 1275-76.

175

362 Md. at 315, 765 A.2d at 119.

195

!d. at 348, 703 A.2d at 1273.

176

ld.

196

173 Md. 309,3 16- I 8, 196 A. 95,98-99 (1937).

177 See Grammer v. State, 203 Md. 200, 223-24, 100 A.2d
257,267-68 (I 953).

178

197 See id. at 317 -18, 196 A. 98-99 (citing 2 Wharton, Criminal
Evidence (Il'h Ed.) 1036; Joy, Amissibility of Confessions,
50).

See 223 Md. 158, 170, 162 A.2d 751, 757-58 (1960).

See 102 Md. App. 648, 653-54, 651 A.2d 403, 406 (1995).
See Hanison v. State, No. 1037, Sept. Term, 2002, 2003 WL
21488146, at * 2-4 (Md. App. June 13,2003).
179

180

White, supra note 35, at 1234-35.

181

See supra notes 61 and 65 and accompanying text.
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198 See 181 Md. at 309-10,29 A.2d at 836 (citing Markley v.
State, 173 Md. 309, 317, 196 A. 95,99 (I 938)).

199

289 Md. at 160,423 A.2d at 554-55.

200

See id. at 160 n.2, 423 A.2d at 555.

Articles
201 See 370 Md. at 547-554,805 A.2d at 1028-1032, cert.
:?;ranted, Maryland v. Pringle, 123 S. Ct. 1571 (2003) (implicitly
answering the Court of Special Appeals' statement that it "is
lU1settled whether a promise to benefit a friend justifies finding
the subsequent confession involuntary." Pringle v. State, 141
Md. App. 292, 310 (200 I
However, the Court did not
explicitly refer to the inducement as "improper." !d.

».

202

See 50 Md. App. 65,77,435 A.2d 821,827 (1981).

203 79 Md. App. 517, 522-24, 558 A.2d 446,448-50 (1989).
204

See36 Md. App. 371, 378-79,373 A.2d 975,979-80 (1977).

205

See 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959).

206

!d.

207 289 Md. at 160,423 A.2d at 555.
208 Id.

(emphasis added).

See 372 U.S. 528,534-35 (1963). Consistent with this due
process standard, the majority of cases in the country apply a
"totality of the circumstances" test to promises related to
relatives' penal status. Voluntariness of Confession as
Affected by Police Statements that Suspect s Relatives will
Benefit by the Confession, 51 A.L.R. 4tll 495, 499 (1987).

209

210

See 327 Md. at 511-12,610 A.2d at 790-91.

2111d.

at 512,610 A.2d at 790 (emphasis added).

212 See 56 Md. App. 450, 484-86, 468 A.2d 353,370-72 (1983).

See 79 Md. App. 53, 66, 555 A.2d 535, 541 (1989), aff'd
on other grounds, 321 Md. 69 (I 990).

219 Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and ConfeSSion, 74 DENY.
U. L. REv. 957, 973 (1997). But see State v. Rettenberger,
984 P.2d 1009, 1016-17 (Utah 1999).
220

See 56 Md. App. at 482-84, 468 A.2d at 369-71.

221 See 48 Md. App. 637,643-44,429 A.2d287, 290-91 (1981).
222 Ball, 347 Md. at 178,699 A.2d at 1180 (quoting Rowe v.
State,41 Md. App. 641, 645,398A.2d485, 488 (1979) (quoting
Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414, 424,311 A.2d483, 488-89
(1973». See Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 721, 404 A.2d
1073, 1081-82 (I 979).

See Ball, 347 Md. at 179,699 A.2d at 1180-81; Finke v.
State, 56 Md. App. 450, 490, 468 A.2d 353,374 (1983) (six
different lies were permissible); Watkins v. State, 59 Md. App.
705,718,478 A.2d 326, 333 (1984) (Wilner, J.); Whittington v.
State, 147 Md. App. 496, 520-25, 809 A.2d 721, cert. denied,
373 Md. 408, 818A.2d 1107 (2003) (applying the "totality of
the circwnstances" test under both the common-law and due
process tests to uphold the vo luntariness of a confession given
many hours after the police utilized a "bogus" chemical test on
the defendant).
223

Green v. State, 91 Md. App. 790, 796-98, 605 A.2d 1001,
1004-1005 (1992) (falsely telling a juvenile that he could receive
the death penalty rendered the statement involuntary).

224

225

See Lewis, 285 Md. at 721-22,404 A.2d at 1081-82.

226

181 Md. at 309-310,29 A.2d 836.

See 51 Md. App. at 354-55,443 A.2d at 655. The court
rested its decision primaJily on other factors. See id.

227

213

228 See White, supra note 94, at 986-87 (quoting Santobello v.

N.Y, 404 U.S. 257 (1971».
214

See id.

215

!d.

216

See 851 S.W.2d 238,253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).

229

See 347 Md. at 178-180, 699 A.2d at 1180-81.

230ld.

at 168-69, 699 A.2d at 1175-76.

231 See 20 Md. App. 577, 591-92, 318 A.2d568, 577-78 (1974).
21741 Md. App. 641,644,398 A.2d 485, 487-88 (1979).
at 645,398 A.2d at 488. The Court favorably analyzed
Rowe in Ball, 347 Md. at 179.
218Id.

232 Ofshe and Leo, The Truth about False Confessions and
Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L. BULL 293, 364-64 n. 356
(2001) [hereinafter The Truth]; See Ofshe and Leo, The
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Decision to Confess Falsely, 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 979, 999
n. 71, 1097-98, 1101-03 (1997).

248

See Ofshe and Leo, The Truth, supra note 232, at 309.
See id. at 303.

233

See 286 Md. at 148,406 A.2d at 417.

249

234

48 Md. App. 726, 732-35, 429 A.2d 308, 711-13(1981).

235

See 50 Md. App. at 77-78,435 A.2d at 827.

250 See "FALSE CONFESSIONS, Inside the Prince George's
Homicide Unit, Allegations of Abuses Mar Murder Cases,"
The Washington Post, June 3, 2001, atAI.

236

See 181 Md. at 309-310, 29 A.2d 836 (emphasis added).

251

237

See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

White, supra note 68, at 150; Ofshe and Leo, supra note
232, at 995, 1065, 1072; Ofshe and Leo, The Truth, supra
note 232, at 346,364-65.

238

See 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (I 986).

252

Magid, supra note 246, at 1190.

239

See id. at 584-85, 515 A.2d at 1173-74.

253

Ofshe and Leo, supra note 232, at 1135.

254

White, supra note 68, at Ill.

255

Ofshe and Leo, supra note 232, at 1118.

See Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 82, 522 A.2d 917,92829 (1987).

240

241

See 3 John Henry Wigmore 819, at 297.

242

327 Md. at 503,610 A.2d at 786.

Welsh White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?,
50 RUTGERS L. REv. 2001,2025-26 (1998); Cassell, supra note
246, at 526.

256

155 Md. 474, 479, 142 A. 497,499 (1928); See State v.
Dobbs, 148 Md. 34, 58-59, 69, 129 A. 275, 284-85, 288-89
(1925); Ford, 181 Md. at 31 0, 29 A.2d at 836. This trend in
the COlU1 of Appeals ended shortly after the Supreme Court,
in Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (I 941), indicated
forthe fIrst time that due process voluntariness does not concern
itself with the truthfulness ofa confession. The Supreme Court
stated, "[t]he aim of the requirement of due process is not to
exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fi.ll1damental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or
false." [d.
243

244 Ball, 347 Md. at 175, 699 A.2d at 1179; Reynolds, 327
Md. at 504, 610 A.2d at 786 (citations omitted).

257 See Pringle, 141 Md. App. at 317-18,785 A.2d at 804-805
(SOImer, J., dissenting), rev'd, 370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016
(2002), cert. granted, Maryland v. Pringle, 123 S. Ct. 1571
(2003).

258

Magid, supra note 246, at 1210.

259

404 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1972) (emphasis added).

260

277 Md. 134, 143-44,255 A.2d 455,460 (1976) (quoting
Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 399, 76 A.2d 729, 736 (1950»
(emphasis added).
261

245

See supra notes 153 and 232; Paul Cassell, The Guilty
and the "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of
Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 l-IARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'y 523 (I999); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police
Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1168
(2001).
246

247

See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 378 n.8.

See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 384-85.

See supra note 153.
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262 See Jones v. State, 188 Md. 263, 270, 52A.2d 484, 487-88
(1946) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 70 N.B. 436 (Mass.
1904».

See Richard P. Gilbert and Charles E. Moylan, Jr.,
Maryland Criminal Law: Practice and Procedure, 39.3,
485, Michie, 1983, for a critique of the Massachusetts Rule.
263
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See Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 665, 511 A.2d 45,
50 (1986).

264

See Jackson, 378 U.S. at 378 n.8 ("[R]econsideration of
[voluntariness] by the jury does not, of course, improperly affect
the jury's determination ofthe credibility or probativeness of
the confession or its ultimate determination of guilt or
innocence. ").

273 Hof, 337 Md. at 617, 655 A.2d at 388 (emphasis added).
The Court used the term 'jury reconsideration" two additional
times. Id. at 618, n.16, 655 A.2d at 389.

265

Hillard, 286 Md. at 150 n.l, 406 A.2d at 418 ("[T]he well
settled principle [is] 'that courts should not decide constitutional
issues unnecessarily.''') (citations omitted).
274

See Saul Kassin, The Psychology of Confession
Evidence, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, 231 (1997).

275

As analyzed above, the Court in both Hillard and Winder
did not apply an unqualified "totality of the circumstances"
test to improper promises. The Court applied a general "cause
and effect" analysis of whether the promises caused the
defendant to confess. See supra Section C.I.

266

267

337 Md. at 595-97,655 A.2d at 377-78.

268 See 306 Md. at 663,511 A.2d at 49-50 (quoting Smith v.
State, 189 Md. 596, 603-04 (1948». From 1965 to 1976, in the
four cases dealing with the issue prior to Brittingham, the
Court of Appeals did not take a position on the issue of which
test the jury should apply. See Dempsey v. State, 277 Md.
134, 143-44,355 A.2d455, 460 (1976); Gill v. State, 265 Md.
350,358-59,289 A.2d 575, 579-80 (I 972); Smith, 237 Md. at
581,207 A.2d at 497; Presley v. State, 224 Md. 550,559, 168
A.2d 510, 514-15 (1961).
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (plurality
opinion).

269

270

See Gilbert and Moylan, supra note 263, at 485.

See 306 Md. at 662-66, 511 A.2d at 49-51. In Williams v.
State, the Court of Appeals held that the jury must be instructed
about the "very heavy weight" to be accorded a violation of
Maryland's prompt presentment rule. Williams v. State, No.
69, Sept. Term, 2002, 2003 WL 21361726, at * 17, (Md. June
13, 2003). Thus, if the jury must be instructed on the specifics
ofthis Maryland non-constitutional rule, then it can be argued
that the jury should also be instructed in more detail on the
specifics of Maryland's non-constitutional, common-law rule
of voluntariness with respect to improper promises and threats.
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See Smith, 189 Md. at 603-604,56 A.2d at 821-22; Linkins
v. State, 202 Md. 212, 223, 96 A.2d 246,251 (1953); Hall v.
State, 223 Md. 158, 172, 162 A.2d 751,759 (1960).
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See supra note 39.
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WRlGHTSMAN AND KASSIN, supra note 39, at 105.

278Id. at 118-123.
When applicable to a juvenile, the trial court should consider
giving a supplementary instruction for the jury to give greater
scrutiny to the voluntariness of a confession. See McIntyre v.
State, 309 Md. 607, 617, 526 A.2d 30, 34-35 (1987). False
confessions are more likely to occur among juveniles and
mentally retarded suspects. See Cassell, supra note 246, at
586; see Magid, supra note 246, at 1192; Comment, Illinois
Weakened Attempt to Prevent False Confessions by Juveniles,
33 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 487 (2002).
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337 Md. at 595, 655 A.2d at 377 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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281

!d. at 619,655 A.2d at 389.

Jacobs v. State, 45 Md. App. 634, 656, 415 A.2d 590, 602
(1980).
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283 See 306 Md. at 664-65, 511 A.2dat 50-51 (quotil1gHillard,
286 Md. at 157).
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337 Md. at 597, 617,655 A.2d at 378,388.
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Pappaconstantinou, 352 Md. at 180, 721 A.2d at 248.
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White, supra note 35, at 1234-35.
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GILBERT AND MOYLAN, supra note 263, at 485 (citing Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964».
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See generally Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
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See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
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327 Md. at 507, 61OA.2d at 788 (quoting Green v. Scully,
850 F.2d 894, 90 I (2d Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added).

Of course, this would not resolve whether wlanimity should
be required on the issue.
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